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This thesis examines direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing in the United States of America. In 2013, about 78 opioid 
prescriptions were being written for every 100 people, and 17,000 people in the United States died from an opioid overdose. 
This study asks, what is the relationship, if any, between contemporary direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing practices 
and opioid mortality in the United States? Contained within an expansive piece of U.S. federal legislation, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is a provision which mandates pharmaceutical manufacturers to report marketing 
payments made to physicians, hospitals, and other relevant healthcare providers. By connecting marketing payments to 
mortality data at several geospatial levels, the study finds that there is a plausible relationship between the direct-to-physician 
pharmaceutical marketing and mortality.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This study is an exploration of a peculiar American marketing practice. During a period              
of market de-regulation in the 1980’s and 1990’s, marketing campaigns by           
pharmaceutical companies began directly targeting patients. As the marketing strategy          
developed pharmaceutical companies redirected their campaigns towards physicians. In         
2013, 3% of U.S. adults were regularly receiving opioid prescriptions to treat            
non-cancerous medical conditions, 1 in 3 U.S. adults received a prescription opioid,            
about 78 opioid prescriptions were being written for every 100 people, and 17,000             
people in the United States died from an opioid overdose. Of those using             1
non-prescription opioids like heroin, about 4 in 5 developed an opioid addiction while             
taking a prescription opioid. Around this time I began to explore a possible connection              2
between the practice of marketing drugs directly to doctors and the public health crisis.              
The exploration began as a broad attempt to evidence relationships between public            
health outcomes and direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing before being distilled         
into an examination of direct-to-physician opioid marketing and drug-related mortality. 
 
My central research question can be summarized as follows: What is the relationship, if              
any, between contemporary direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing practices and        
opioid mortality in the United States? More specifically, what can uniquely large            
datasets and the methods associated with them tell us about this possible relationship?             
Primarily, this is a quantitative endeavour that operationalizes marketing by way of            
physician-industry financial interactions, and opioid mortality by way of public health           
statistics. 
 
1.1 THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 
1 K.M.​ ​Dunn, K.W. Saunders, C.M. Rutter, et al., “Overdose and prescribed opioids: Associations among 
chronic non-cancer pain patients,” ​Annals of Internal Medicine​ ​152, no. 2  (2010): 85-92.; Center for 
Disease Control, “Opioid Prescribing Rate Maps,” (2013). 
2 National Institute on Drug Abuse Prescription. “Opioid Use is a Risk Factor for Heroin Use,” (2018). 
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The practices of the pharmaceutical industry have a substantial and well-documented           
impact on global health. In the United States, the pharmaceutical industry maintains            
networks of financial relationships with regulatory bodies, public policy makers, drug           
prescribers, and consumers. As such, public policy makers have taken a particular            
interest in collaboration and regulation with the pharmaceutical industry. In the late            
1990’s, one of these regulatory bodies, the United States’ Food and Drug            
Administration (FDA), issued informal guidelines that encouraged the emergence of          
contemporary direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising strategies. Henceforth,      3
the marketing practices of the global pharmaceutical industry have become the subject            
of increasing examination in public health, medical, and sociological inquiry. Among           
these marketing practices is a practice which I refer to as direct-to-physician            
pharmaceutical marketing. Direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing is the giving        
of money, goods, gifts, and services by pharmaceutical companies directly to doctors. In             
the United States this form of marketing is a nearly ubiquitous practice in the              
pharmaceutical industry and almost all physicians report some financial relationship          
with the pharmaceutical industry. Examples of prevalent forms of direct-to-physician          4
pharmaceutical marketing include cash payments, vacations, and dinners at high-end          
restaurants. 
 
Recently, national level healthcare regulators in the United States have sought to            
address the marketing phenomenon. Contained within an expansive piece of U.S.           
federal legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) or             
Obamacare, is a provision which mandates pharmaceutical manufacturers to report          
marketing payments made to physicians, hospitals, and other relevant healthcare          
providers. These financial-relationship and marketing data are gathered by a program           5
within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a large U.S. government             
body which facilitates medical care for qualifying U.S. residents. This data gathering            
3 J.A. Greene and D. Herzberg,  “Hidden in plain sight: Marketing prescription drugs to consumers in the 
twentieth century,”​ American Journal of Public Health ​100 no.5 (2010): 793–803. 
4 Eric G. Campbell, Russell L. Gruen, James Mountford, Lawrence G. Miller, Paul D. Cleary, and David 
Blumenthal. "A National Survey of Physician–Industry Relationships." ​New England Journal of Medicine 
356, no. 17 (2007): 1742-750. 
5 ​Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. Section 6002. (2010).  
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program is referred to as the Open Payments Program of the Centers for Medicare and               
Medicaid (OPP). 
 
The OPP has agglomerated and published data concerning the financial relationships           
between drug companies and doctors. The data, also referred to as Open Payments Data,              
affords significant research opportunities because it is the first publicly accessible,           
nationally representative, and systematically collected dataset which documents the         
financial relationships between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry in the United           
States. The dataset has some significant shortcomings. Unlike health outcomes data in            
some Nordic states that are available at the individual level, this sort of individual-level              
health outcomes data is often unavailable in the U.S. and is not employed in this study.                
Therefore, I linked Open Payments data to other nationally representative datasets in            
order to make it useful for this study. Following the data collectors’ own words, I               
maintain that the thinking and policy that led to the creation of the Open Payments               
dataset was driven by a desire to control healthcare costs in the public sector. This               6
project, a sociological and public health project, is an attempt to reappropriate the             
cost-controlling efforts of healthcare economists and policymakers to better understand          
the origins or development of the “opioid crisis” by interrogating the relationships            
between doctors and drug makers. 
 
A central assumption of this study is that direct-to-physician marketing, within the            
context of a global capitalism, is employed by pharmaceutical firms because it augments             
their sales, revenues and aggregate profitability. Following Karl Marx’s framework in           
Capital Vol. I ​, I conceive of direct-to-physician marketing as a form of constant capital,              
an input cost or investment with the aim of generating surplus capital. The thinking, for               7
better or worse, follows a rigid sort of economic determinism. That is not to say that                
Marx himself is an economic determinist, but my reading and application of ​Capital is              
quite deterministic. 
 
6 U.S. General Services Administration. “Open Payments Apps Help Healthcare Professionals Track 
Reporting On The Go”. March 2014. 
7 Karl Marx, ​Capital, Vol I​., translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling,  (New York: International 
Publishers 1972 [1867]) Chapter 8: Constant Capital and Variable Capital. 199-212  
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Drawing substantially on Open Payments Data, the U.S. Census Bureau’s demographic           
and small area health coverage estimates (SAHIE), and state and regional mortality            
data, a hypothesized relationship between direct-to-physician marketing and opioid         
mortality is examined. Analytically, this is accomplished by compiling correlation          
matrices to explore potential relationships among and between marketers, physicians,          
mortality, and other relevant factors. Following this preliminary examination,         
multivariate linear regression and Poisson regression are utilized to assess drug related            
mortality nationwide via county-level analysis, and in 100 densely populated urban           
areas where more complete and robust data are available. Finally, logarithmic           
transformation of key variables is employed in order to normalize the data. 
 
1.2 THE POLITICS OF HEALTHCARE CORPORATIONS: THEIR REGULATORS 
AND OTHER MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
Macroeconomic conditions have well-documented relationships to health outcomes.        
Some measures of public health tied to human development might ​necessarily reflect            
macroeconomic conditions. However, in this study, larger questions which concern both           
political economy and orthodox macroeconomics are largely neglected. Instead, I situate           
questions of politics and economy firmly within settler-colonial, racial capitalism, the           
modern nation state and so forth. Even within the classically liberal public health             
discourse, a vast network of interlocking directorates, corruption, and bribery are noted            
as defining characteristics of the U.S pharmaceutical and regulatory institutions. These           8
administrative and fiscal relationships, largely characterised by monetary transactions         
and in-kind goods and services, are safeguarded by a human rights discourse. More             
specifically, these financial relationships constitute a form of “free speech.” In addition            
to the implicit protection afforded by a discourse of fiscal relationships constituting a             
form of free speech, special and explicit legal protection and approval is afforded to              
private sector entities, including pharmaceutical companies. This is exemplified by a           
2010 U.S. Supreme Court ruling concerned with constitutional law, in which the court             
8 Leadership roles in multiple, legally separate corporations or entities. Here the term is used broadly and 
also refers to conflicting leadership roles spanning public, regulatory bodies, and private, profit-seeking 
firms.​ See​ John Scott, ​Corporate Business and Capitalist Classes. Big Business and Corporate Power 
(Oxford: ​Oxford University Press ​, 1997): 7 and  John Braithwaite ​Corporate Crime in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry ​(​Routledge,​ 1984). 
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ruled that the U.S. federal government may not impose restrictions on monetary            
transactions in the form of anonymous ‘donations’ to politicians and political           
campaigns. That is to say, ​corporate entities in the United States have the legal right to                9
finance politicians, anonymously and without monetary limit, and to restrict this practice            
would be a violation of the most fundamental human rights. Transposing this liberal             
legal construct on the pharmaceutical sector, by exercising their constitutionally          
guaranteed right, it is clear that ​for-profit pharmaceutical corporations finance the           
political campaigns and projects of the elected and appointed officials who are charged             
with the regulation of the pharmaceutical corporations. Of course, there are laws            
against bribery and other sorts of collusion. Nonetheless, pharmaceutical companies are           
paying their regulators even if it is via indirect means. 
 
In addition to the systematic, industry-wide, financial collusion between pharmaceutical          
regulatory bodies and pharmaceutical manufacturers, those serving in leadership roles          
often revolve between government regulatory bodies, the Drug Enforcement         
Administration, and for-profit healthcare companies. This is commonly referred to as a            10
“revolving door”. For example, during the period examined in this study, the director of              
the CDC Washington Office, a position “which serves as a critical link between CDC              
and the Washington policy community”, had assumed the role after leaving their            
position as Senior Vice President of a major lobbying firm which works to assist              
pharmaceutical and healthcare firms “address regulatory and operational issues such as           
the Stark Act, Anti-Kickback Statute and FDA guidelines.” In a similar vein, the             11
highest ranking member of the United States government body responsible for           
collecting the Open Payments Data, came to the position after being appointed by the              
President of the United States, leaving his most recent role as Executive Vice President              
9 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, No. 08-205, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
10 Dave Davies, “Tales Of Corporate Painkiller Pushing: 'The Death Rates Just Soared'” National Public 
Radio, 22 August 2019, Accessed 24 March 2020. 
11“Director, CDC Washington Office”. September 23, 2015, accessed May 26, 2016, 
http://www.cdc.gov/about/leadership/new-leaders/cdcwashington.html​.; LLP, Faegre Baker Daniels. 
“Health Care - the Law Firm of Faegre Baker Daniels.” 2000. Accessed May 26, 2016. 
http://www.faegrebd.com/Health-Care​. 
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of Optum, a major healthcare subsidiary of the largest healthcare corporation in the             
United States.  12
 
These examples, while anecdotal, are indicative of the structure and function of the             
broader healthcare and pharmaceutical industries in the United States. Writing from           
within the conflict paradigm, the power structure of U.S. American public-private           
collusion has been systematically documented by the critical theorist and sociologist G.            
William Domhoff in his works on class dynamics and the so-called power elite, notably              
in his book ​Who Rules America? ​. Domhoff’s tools for network analysis are publicly             13
available and can be used to evidence the interlocking structure between pharmaceutical            
firms and note conflicts of interest. Public service announcements openly evidence the            14
same collusion. Drawing a parallel to the infamous military-industrial complex,          15
physician Arnold S. Relman offers an account of the ‘medical-industrial complex.           16
Published in 1980 in the ​New England Journal of Medicine ​, Relman notes the             
dominance of pharmaceutical manufacturers in the healthcare industry and expresses          
concern about the breadth of privatization and role of regulation.  17
 
1.3 MARKETING AS A DETERMINANT OF HEALTH OUTCOMES 
This study frames direct-to-physician pharmaceutical and opioid marketing as         
constituting a social determinant of health within the broader context of the            
pharmaceutical-industrial complex. Mortality is employed as the key outcome measure.  
 
Existing literature documents the importance of industry payments to physicians. A           
2016 study of physicians’ prescribing patterns in the state of Massachusetts found that             
12 ​"CMS Leadership." Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Accessed June 22, 2016. 
https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/leadership/. 
13 G. William Domhoff, ​Who Rules America?,​ 7th ed. 2014. 
14 G. William Domhoff, “Who Rules America: Search a Database of the Power Elite.” 2012. Accessed 
June 1, 2016. http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power_elite/search.html. 
15 Regulatory Affairs Professionals Society. “FDA Seeks Industry Representation on 17 of Its Drug 
Advisory Committees.” 2016. Accessed November 1, 2016. 
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/04/15/21977/FDA-Seeks-Industry-Representation-on-
17-of-its-Drug-Advisory-Committees/. 
16 Arnold S. Relman,  "The New Medical-Industrial Complex," New England Journal of Medicine 303, 
no. 17, (1980): 963. 
17 ​Ibid. 963-970. 
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industry payments have a significant impact, the authors writing, “​Payments for           
educational training were associated with a 4.8% increase in the rate of brand-name             
prescribing.”   18
 
While pharmaceutical advertising to consumers is a matter of significant sociological           
interest as it relates to health outcomes, the current study concerns itself chiefly with the               
role of direct-to-physician marketing. This is because of the physicians’ pivotal role in             
prescription drug sales and consumption. For most U.S. American prescription drug           
consumers, physicians serve as gatekeepers and advisors. Very few prescription-only          
drugs are obtained without prior facilitation by a physician or other healthcare            
professional (eg. nurse practitioner). Moreover, within the current methodological         
framework, one which relies on the county as the unit of analysis, assessing             
direct-to-consumer advertising presents analytical difficulties because the advertising is         
not well-documented at the county-level. The absence of direct-to-consumer advertising          
as a covariate is an important shortcoming of the study. 
 
2.0 HEALTH OUTCOMES AND DIRECT-TO-PHYSICIAN MARKETING 
Another relevant factor is public policy and the interplay between illicit and prescription             
opioid abuse, as well as non-opioid drugs used for ostensibly non-medical purposes.            
Public health researchers contend that efforts to criminalize and prosecute prescription           
drug addiction, normative social values dependent on drug status and perceived           
legitimacy, and the quality and purity of prescription drugs relative to those            
manufactured outside of legal regulation, have notable effects in rising prescription drug            
use, illicit drug use, and their interplay. , , Conversely, in the Commonwealth of            19 20 21
Kentucky, increased regulation, police action, and prosecution and criminalization of          
18 ​J.S. Yeh, J.M. Franklin, J. Avorn, J. Landon, et. al. “Association of Industry Payments to Physicians 
With the Prescribing of Brand-name Statins in Massachusetts” ​JAMA Internal Medicine ​176,  no. 6 
(2016): 763-768. 
19 T.J. Cicero, E.H. Adams, A. Geller, J.A. Inciardi, et. al. “A post-marketing surveillance program to 
monitor Ultram (tramadol hydrochloride) abuse in the United States.” ​Drug Alcohol Dependence​ 57, 
(1999): 7–22. 
20 E.C. Senay. “Clinical experience with T’s & B’s.” ​Drug Alcohol Dependence​ 14 (1985): 305–311. 
21 G.E. Woody, E.C. Senay, A. Geller, E.H. Adams, et. al. “An independent assessment of MEDWatch 
reporting for abuse/dependence and withdrawal from Ultram (tramadol hydrochloride).” ​Drug Alcohol 
Dependence ​72, (2003): 163–168. 
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prescription drugs has very likely resulted in an increase in illicit opioid use. Kentucky’s              
Office of Drug Control Policy publically claims, “A key driver behind the uptick in              
heroin abuse was the reformulation of two widely abused prescription pain drugs,            
making them harder to crush and snort. Drug manufacturers reformulated OxyContin in            
2010 and Opana in 2011.” Policy variation as it concerns illicit and prescription drug              22
regulation and their availability might account for some of the variation in mortality.             
Unfortunately, this variation is not operationalized in the current study. 
 
2.1 INTERSECTIONAL PARADIGMS AND HEALTH COMPLEXITY THEORY 
Noting the exemplary health inequalities in the United States, especially access to            
healthcare, the supposed impact of pharmaceutical marketing practices is likely to vary            
across social groupings. ​The intersections of masculinity, class, and white supremacy           
are documented as playing a significant role as it concerns opioid abuse and mortality.              23
However, due to a lack of accessible and relevant data that is compatible via inferential               
statistics with the key measures of mortality, and the methodological limitations of this             
study, the impact of direct-to-physician opioid marketing on mortality across social           
groups is rendered relatively ambiguous. 
 
Drawing on Elizabeth ​McGibbon and Charmaine ​McPherson​’s arguments in ​Applying          
Intersectionality & Complexity Theory to Address the Social Determinants of Women's           
Health ​, the current study seeks to incorporate some of these concerns into the analytical              
design. McGibbon and McPherson suggest that “feminist intersectionality theory can be           
applied in tandem with complexity theory to support the amelioration of inequities in             
the social determinants of women’s health.”   24
 
22 Kentucky Office of Drug Control Policy,  “The Heroin Epidemic.” Retrieved February 29, 2016, from 
http://odcp.ky.gov/Pages/The-Heroin-Epidemic.aspx  
23 Anne Case and Angus Deaton. “Rising morbidity and mortality in midlife among white non-Hispanic 
Americans in the 21st century.” ​PNAS​ 112 no. 49 (2015). 
24 Elizabeth McGibben and Charmaine McPherson. "Applying Intersectionality & Complexity Theory to 
Address the Social Determinants of Women’s Health." Accessed 29 February 2016. 
https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/27217/1/10.1_mcgibbon_mcpherson.pdf. 
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Interestingly, health researchers have found that, “Native Americans and Asians, had           
32% lower odds of having a visit where an opioid was prescribed.” This finding is               25
consistent with Anne Case’s and Angus Deaton’s findings concerning a rise in            
white-middle class mortality, and with theories of whiteness which contend that           
normative understandings of white folks, would suggest that they are more trustworthy,            
thus less likely to abuse medications, and they are more sensitive to pain than people of                
color who are often seen as not-fully-human, animalistic, and thus more tolerant of             
physical pain. Additionally, this manifestation of white supremacy is empirically          26
evidenced by biologists studying public health.  27
 
The CDC analyzed data from the 2012 National Health Interview survey finding severe             
disparities in access to coverage by race. According to the CDC’s ​Summary Health             28
Statistics for U.S. Adults: National Health Interview Survey, 2012​, “Among adults           
under age 65, 49% who were uninsured had no visits to a doctor or other health                
professional in the past 12 months compared with 17% having private health care             
coverage and 14% with Medicaid.” The report also finds that white men visit             29
physicians more frequently than men in any other gender and racial demographic.            30
Thus, it seems reasonable to postulate that white men might use prescription drugs with              
greater frequency. The role of mass incarceration, as it disproportionately affects men of             
color, and systemically inhibits said men from access to healthcare, is unknown. In             
short, the existing sociological theory and circumstantial evidence suggests that people           
with greater and more frequent contact with health professionals, are more likely to die              
from drug poisoning or its consequences, than their less medically attended peers. 
25 Yngvild Olsen, Gail L. Daumit, and Daniel E. Ford. "Opioid Prescriptions by U.S. Primary Care 
Physicians From 1992 to 2001." ​ The Journal of Pain ​7, no. 4 (2006): 225-35. 
26 Case and Deaton. 
27 White supremacy in sociological literature has specific meanings which are distinct from popular and 
reductive uses of the term. For more on this, see Charles Mills’ ​The Racial​ ​Contract​, Paul Gilroy’s ​The 
Black Atlantic​, Barnor Hesse’s concept ​Raceocracy​, and Patricia Hill Collins ​Black Feminist Thought​; 
Alessio Avenanti, Angela Sirigu, and Salvatore M. Aglioti. "Racial bias reduces empathic sensorimotor 
resonance with other-race pain." ​Current Biology​ 20, no. 11 (2010): 1018-1022. 
28 CDC National Center for Health Statistics. “NCHS Data on Racial and Ethnic Disparities.” July 2014. 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/factsheets/factsheet_disparities.pdf 
29 CDC National Center for Health Statistics. “Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Adults: National Health 
Interview Survey, 2012.” Vital and Health Statistics. Vol. 10. Issue. 260. February 2014. 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_260.pdf 
30 Ibid. 
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2.2 DIRECT-TO-PHYSICIAN PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING: EFFECTS IN 
THE PUBLIC HEALTH LITERATURE 
In the 1970’s U.S. American sociologists first made explicit the interlocking directorates            
found within the pharmaceutical and banking sectors. Moreover, the conflicts of           31
interest existing within the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) —the regulatory            
body charged with the study and approval of all prescription drugs in the U.S— and the                
pharmaceutical industry are extensive according to several of FDA reports and           
spokespersons who have admitted to hiding evidence of fraud in medical research trials.             
Given what amounts to a pervasive and systemic collusion of interests between state             
regulatory agencies and private entities, the data provided via CMS must be treated with              
great skepticism if they should be used in scientific inquiry. 
 
In ​The Effects of Pharmaceutical Firm Enticements on Physician Prescribing Patterns           
researchers summarize the work concisely in their abstract writing: 
“We examined the impact on physician prescribing patterns of pharmaceutical 
firms offering all-expenses-paid trips to popular sunbelt vacation sites to attend 
symposia sponsored by a pharmaceutical company. The impact was assessed by 
tracking the pharmacy inventory usage reports for two drugs before and after the 
symposia... A significant increase in the prescribing pattern of both drugs occurred 
following the symposia. The usage of drug A increased from a mean of 81 +/- 44 
units before the symposium to a mean of 272 +/- 117 after the symposium (p < 
0.001). The usage of drug B changed from 34 +/- 30 units before the symposium 
to 87 +/- 24 units (p < 0.001) after the symposium. These changed prescribing 
patterns were also significantly different from the national usage patterns... These 
alterations in prescribing patterns occurred even though the majority of physicians 
who attended the symposia believed that such enticements would not alter their 
prescribing patterns.”  32
 
The United States is unique among developed states in that it permits            
direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing. The private influence on state-run        33
regulatory bodies is well-documented, but the public health effects consequent of these            
31 Ned Mccraine and Martin J. Murray. "The Pharmaceutical Industry: A Further Study in Corporate 
Power." ​International Journal of Health Services ​ 8, no. 4 (1978): 573-88. 
32 James P. Orlowski and Leon Wateska. “The Effects of Pharmaceutical Firm Enticements on Physician 
Prescribing Patterns.” ​Chest​ 102, no. 1 (July 1992): 270–73. 
33 “Developed states,” “Global North,” “1st World,” and so on, are signifiers for states which are located 
—in Wallersteinian terms— as closer to the “core.” See ​World Systems Theory Vol. 1​. The term 
“developed states” does not capture how states have come to be developed. 
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public-private relationships are far from understood particularly as it concerns collusion           
in the institution of pharmacy. During the period from 1999 to 2012, prescription opioid              
consumption in the United States was at an unprecedented high. However, the rhetoric             34
of the pharmaceutical industry and lobby at large suggests that increased spending in the              
form of direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing and physician education should         
yield an improvement in public health outcomes. By examining the relationships among            
and between pharmaceutical marketing, prescribing behaviors, and health outcomes,         
this study explores possible consequences of direct-to-physician pharmaceutical        
marketing. 
 
The marketing methods of the pharmaceutical industry are observable via the data at             
hand, the details of their approach and reasoning however, remain unexplained, it            
demands historical and qualitative explanation. To be clear, we can see how industry             
conducts direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing in monetary and tangible terms,         
what is not ostensibly clear by the data, is their collective logic and processes which               
result in direct-to-physician marketing as we observe it in relatively conventional fiscal            
terms. 
 
Unequal public trust in physicians, across class and race groups especially, is of             
theoretical relevance. Among U.S. medical sociologists and public health researchers it           
is common knowledge that throughout the 19th and 20th century, western healthcare            
providers both in the private and public sectors, routinely neglected to actively practice             
informed consent with respect to medical research conducted on those seen as inferior             
on the basis of their identities. This phenomenon is particularly apparent and            
pronounced in incidents like the Tuskegee syphilis experiments, the legacy of which has             
far reaching and devastating effects. Other incidents implicate Harvard and John           35
Hopkins universities, where researchers conducted unanesthetized gynecological       
34 ​E.D.​ ​Kantor, C.D. Rehm, J.S. Haas, A.T. Chan, et. al. “Trends in Prescription Drug Use among Adults 
in the United States from 1999-2012.” ​JAMA ​314 no.17 (2015): 1818-31. 
35 S.B. Thomas and S.C. Quinn. “The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 1932 to 1972: implications for HIV 
education and AIDS risk education programs in the black community.” ​American Journal of Public 
Health ​81, no. 11 (November 1991): 1498-1505. 
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experiments conducted on females of color deemed pain adept due to their race.             36
Similarly, physicians engaged in infanticide, forced reproductive sterilization, and the          
military testing of chemical weapons on mostly Black folks living in public housing in              
St. Louis, Missouri. This public mistrust, especially among the marginalized, of the            37
medical community continues to exhibit consequences across stratified racial and class           
lines. As such, the pharmaceutical industry might target these communities and their            
physicians accordingly. Moreover, these already marginalized groups are less likely to           
have access to healthcare and are more likely to forgo or even avoid medical treatment               
altogether. 
 
2.3 PRESCRIBING PATTERNS 
Another central assumption of this project is that physician behaviors have an impact on              
health outcomes. Among these physician behaviors is a pattern of drug prescribing. It is              
important to note that substantial sociological, anthropological, and public health          
literature suggests that by comparison to healthcare systems, socioeconomic         
determinants of health have a greater explanatory capacity as it concerns various health             
outcomes. Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence indicating harmful effects of          38
prescribing patterns on health outcomes. For example, a 2015 longitudinal cohort study            
of adults ​(n=​2848) in the U.S. who had experienced a nonfatal opioid overdose found              
that 91% of them were subsequently represcribed opioids, and those that were            
represcribed opioids were found to be disproportionately prone to recurrent overdose.  39
 
In short, if direct-to-physician marketing did not have an impact on physicians’            
prescribing patterns, and in turn pharmaceutical sales and revenues, the pharmaceutical           
industry, which is conceived of as a self-interested, profit-driven actor, would not            
engage in the practice. Given the documented impact of opioid prescribing patterns on             
36 Harriet A. Washington, ​Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black 
Americans from Colonial Times to the Present​. New York, NY: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 
2008. 
37 Ibid. 
38 M. G. Marmot and Richard G. Wilkinson. ​Social Determinants of Health​. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006. 
39 Marc R.  Larochelle, Jane M. Liebschutz, Fang Zhang, Dennis Ross-Degnan, et. al. "Opioid Prescribing 
After Nonfatal Overdose and Association With Repeated Overdose." ​Annals of Internal Medicine​ 164, no. 
1 (2015): 1. 
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the incidence of overdose, and subsequent opioid related mortality, it seems           
sociologically reasonable and socially important to explore the possibility that          
direct-to-physician marketing also has an impact on indicators of social well being. 
 
3.0 EXISTING LITERATURE: PROPUBLICA  
Physicians’ attitudes concerning pharmaceutical representatives and marketing practices        
have been examined extensively in survey research and in systematic reviews of            
pharmaceutical marketing literature. Findings by Propublica, a ‘big data’ and media           40
firm, suggest that physician prescribing patterns are directly correlated with          
pharmaceutical marketing expenditures by the amount expended and by the type of            
expenditure, specifically noting that physicians who received remittances from the          
pharmaceutical industry for speaking at a conference or event were more likely to             
prescribe drugs produced or sold by the paying company. This analysis was            41
accomplished by linking address and name data across datasets and integrating the 2014             
Open Payments data with data from another U.S. prescription drug program called            
Medicare Part D. Record attrition as a consequence of unmatched links was minimal,             
Propublica reported that the methods allowed for more than 99.7% of physicians to be              
linked across datasets. This finding supports the central assumption of this study, that             
pharmaceutical marketing has an impact, or at the very least is related to, prescription              
patterns. 
 
Existing literature concerning Open Payments Data is generally concerned with (1) the            
data’s application within a given medical subfield, (2) the data’s composition, and (3)             
the implementation and legislative processes concerning the Open Payments Program.  
Some significant variance in payments to physicians in at least one specialty and census              
region (in frequency and total reported amount) was demonstrated in early assessments            
of the data. Further examination has revealed significant variation in payment amounts            42
40 Puneet Manchanda and Elisabeth Honka. “The Effects and Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review.”​ Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics ​ 5 no. 2. 
(March 2013). 
41 Ryann Grochowski Jones and Charles Ornstein. “Matching Industry Payments to Medicare Prescribing 
Patterns: An Analysis.” ​ProPublica.​ (March 2016). 
42 V.K. Rathi, A.M. Samuel, and S. Mehra,  “Industry ties in otolaryngology: initial insights from the 
physician payment sunshine act.” ​Otolaryngology - Head Neck Surgery ​(June 2015). 
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across medical specialties and subspecialties. These findings provide an empirical          43
basis on which the current study builds by investigating payments across all reported             
specialties. 
 
 
 
3.1 OPEN PAYMENTS LITERATURE 
The current study relies on established conventions in public health, sociological, and            
epidemiological literature to guide the construction of crude mortality rates. Among the            
studies with such a coding procedure, D.K. Wysowski’s study contained a procedure for             
coding prescription drug-related mortality, and it provides a basis for this study. It also              44
serves to provide a process for selecting particularly relevant ICD-10-CM codes by            
setting a n ​≥ 1000 limitation on causes listed as underlying or multiple on death               
certificates. A dramatic increase in methadone, amphetamine, and        45
psychostimulant-related mortality is noted, as well as mortality related to          
anticoagulants. 
 
A research team at Northwestern University employed the Open Payments data to            
evaluate the potential conflict of interest between neurosurgeons and osteopathic          
surgeons, finding that physicians that received payments from pharmaceutical         
companies and other medical device companies were no more likely to have            
complications associated with their surgeries than their united counterparts who          
received no industry payments.  46
 
As a matter of understanding how Open Payments are reported, what limitations there             
are to the financial data, and what the risks and opportunities for MPCs are, it behooves                
43 Andre M. Samuel, , Matthew L. Webb, Adam M. Lukasiewicz, Daniel D. Bohl, et. al. "Orthopaedic 
Surgeons Receive the Most Industry Payments to Physicians but Large Disparities Are Seen in Sunshine 
Act Data." ​Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research​ 473, no. 10 (June 2015): 3297-3306.  
44 D.K. Wysowski,  “Surveillance of Prescription Drug-related Mortality Using Death Certificate Data” 
Drug Safety​ 30 no. 6 (2007): 533-40. 
45 Ibid. 
46R.W. Cook,  J.A. Weiner, M.S. Schallmo,  D.S. Chun, et, al. "Conflicts of Interest in Spine Surgeons: 
An Analysis of the Effects of Industry Payments on Practice Patterns and Complication Rates in Spine 
Surgery." ​Spine Journal​ 16 no. 10 (2016): 347-348. 
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us to review the legal literature on the subject. Christian Dingler’s Opening Pandora's             
Box: The ​Open ​Payments Reporting Requirements develops the discussion on          
compliance with this component of the ACA. The so-called loopholes in the program             47
are further discussed by Paul Lichter in Implications of the Sunshine Act: Revelations,             
Loopholes, and Impact which finds ​that it is permissible for unrestricted grants to be              
documented and categorized as research payments. Grants of this nature include           48
salaries for physicians involved, but the nature of the work and compensation amount             
are not required to be reported in the open payments data.  49
 
The problem of industry-physician conflicts of interests is not limited to study by             
sociologists and public health researchers. In an article written in 2010 by medical             
professionals, there is a call for a centralized system of accountability due to what they               
call “rife” conflicts of interests within academic medical centers.  50
 
3.2 THE OPEN PAYMENTS DATA: REPORTING AND LIMITATIONS 
In and of itself, the OPP data is useful and holds significant research potential as is 
evidenced by a number of studies that use it descriptively.  However, standing alone it 51
is not suitable to address the subject of the research question: What is the nature of the 
relationship, if any, between contemporary direct-to-physician pharmaceutical 
marketing practices and opioid mortality in the United States of America since the 
marketing practice emerged in the late 1990’s? In order to address this question, the data 
had to be reconfigured. This is the reason for the county-level aggregation and 
integration with demographic data.  
 
The guide to reporting payments explicitly references 18 U.S. Code § 1030 - Fraud and 
related activity in connection with computers in an effort to protect the data’s integrity 
47 Christian Dingler,  “Opening Pandora's Box: The Open ​Payments ​ Reporting Requirements”​ Health Law 
Litigation​ (June 2014). 
48Paul R. Lichter. “Implications of the Sunshine Act: Revelations, Loopholes, and Impact” ​American 
Academy of Ophthalmology​ (2015): 653-655. 
49Ibid. 
50 B.A. Liang and  T. Mackey, “Confronting conflict: addressing institutional conflicts of interest in 
academic medical centers” ​American Journal of Law and  Medicine​ 36 (2010): 136–187. 
51CDC​ ​Open Payments Program,. “Open Payments User Guide” Accessed May 3, 2016. 
https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/Downloads/Open-Payments-User-Guide.pdf. 
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and the integrity of the reporting entities. The Open Payments Program allows third 
parties to report the data, and requires that specific individuals —not firms— be named 
in the reporting process to be held liable. The language of the legislation allows anyone 
with the legal authority to represent an applicable manufacturer or provider in the 
position of ‘officer’ to legally attest to the quality of the data. 
 
CMS reports that it has been able to verify the identity of 98.8% of payment recipients,                
but notes that unverified recipients’ payments are excluded from the data. The Open             52
Payments data, however, does not extend to nurse practitioners or physician assistants,            
both of which are legally permitted to prescribe medication. 
 
The American Medical Association (AMA) criticizes the OPP claiming that it has an             
“​overly complex registration process and [provides] inadequate opportunity for         
physicians to review their individual data.” This criticism seems to question the            53
integrity of the data. While the medical and academic rhetoric regarding the data’s             
accuracy seems to concern itself with perceptions of individual physicians and patient            
misinformation, it does little to put forth concern regarding the data’s integrity on a              
structural level. 
 
The collection and gathering of Open Payments data is the legal responsibility of             
pharmaceutical firms. In addition to data-reliability concerns stemming from this          
process —a process in which the regulated industry guides the regulation process—            
there are other limitations to the data. The data excludes payments to nurses, nurse              
practitioners, and physicians in residency. The Open Payments data is limited to            
payments pertaining to prescription drugs covered under Medicare and Medicaid. Drugs           
not covered by a federal payer may be marketed differently, this creates a fundamental              
limitation, a bias in the study with largely unknown consequences. “patients with            
Medicaid (OR 2.09 [95% CI 1.82-2.40]) or Medicare (OR 2.00 [95% CI 1.68-2.39]) had              
52 Thomas Sullivan, “Physician Payments Sunshine Act: CMS posts 2014 Open Payments Data Totaling 
$6.49 Billion” ​Policy and Medicine ​(May 2018). 
53 American Medical Association, “Media Guide for Reporting Open Payments Data” Web. (2014) 
Updated June 2015. 
https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-releases/ama-guide-media-reporting-open-payments-data-rel
ease-0 
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significantly higher odds of having a visit where an opiate was prescribed compared to              
patients in private fee-for-service plans.”  54
 
The marketing strategies of the pharmaceutical industry, particularly multinational         
pharmaceutical companies, have been criticized by social researchers and policymakers          
alike. As a component of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) the Centers for Medicaid and               
Medicare (CMS) began a program in which payments from pharmaceutical companies           
to physicians and teaching hospitals are documented. The data is voluminous and            
comprises 6 unique datasets. This data includes all applicable manufacturers and group            
purchasing organizations who are in acting accordance with the federal regulation.           
Mounting criticism of the OPP is readily found in a search of academic databases which               
yields article titles like, “​Open Payments': Has CMS gone too far?​”, “​Open payments             
may help drive malpractice claims ​”, and “​'Open Payments' moves forward despite           
snags.​”  55
 
3.3 A REVIEW OF DIRECT-TO-PHYSICIAN PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING 
LITERATURE 
Prior to the implementation of the Open Payments Program, in 2007, a nationwide             
survey of physicians in the United States (n = 3,167) found that of the 58% of                
physicians that responded, 94% reported some financial relationship with the          
pharmaceutical industry. The relationships of interest are quite similar to those           56
documented in the Open Payments data. They include consulting fees, payments for            
various “professional activities”, and free lunches. Also, a history of regulatory           57
attempts at sub-national-levels is documented in a work entitled The Physician Payment            
Sunshine Act.  58
54 N.D. Volkow, T.A. McLellan, J.H. Cotto, M. Karithanam, et. al., “Characteristics of Opioid 
Prescriptions in 2009.”​ JAMA​ ​305 no. 13 ​(April ​2011): 1299-1301. 
55 Bob Gatty, ​“ ​Open Payments': Has CMS gone too far?​”​ Urology Times. ​(January 2014).; Bob Gatty. 
“​'Open Payments' moves forward despite snags.​” ​Urology Times ​(September 2014).; Alicia Gallegos, 
“Open Payments may help drive malpractice claims” ​ CHEST Physician​ (September 2014). 
56 E.G. Campbell, R.L. Gruen, J. Mountford, L.G. Miller LG et. al., “A National Survey of 
Physician–Industry Relationships.” ​New England Journal of Medicine 357, no. 5 ​(August 2007): 
507–508. 
57 Ibid. 
58Sachin Santhakumar and Eli Y. Adashi. “The Physician Payment Sunshine Act.” ​JAMA​ 313, no. 1 
(January 2015): 23. 
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Underpinning specific theoretical assumptions and analytical direction put forth in the           
current study, is a Norwegian study concerned with the sale of prescription drugs. The              
study provides a methodological precedent for aggregating financial data concerning          
prescription drugs at the individual and county-levels, and more importantly, finds sales            
of drugs with abuse potential predicts rates of drug abuse even in spite of relatively               
strict regulatory measures.  59
 
Of the findings in ​Industry Financial Relationships in Orthopaedic Surgery the           
distribution of total dollars received by individual physicians — most notably           
orthopedic surgeons— is especially relevant to the current study. The researchers find            60
that the total dollars received are concentrated among a small group of physicians,             
namely orthopedic surgeons. Making up less than 1% of all those practicing, they             
nonetheless received nearly 70% of the total monetary value. Additionally, the study            61
puts forth a procedure for linking Open Payments data at the geographical level, as well               
as methods for normalizing payments data across subspecialties.  62
 
An additional mediating factor in direct-to-physician pharmaceutical advertising is the          
role of direct-to-consumer advertising. This strategy affects physicians in two clearly           
distinguishable ways. Direct-to-consumer advertising is commonplace in the national         
media. Physicians are exposed to it directly while listening to the radio or watching              
television. Importantly, these advertisements often encourage consumers to “ask your          
doctor about [given drug]”. Thus, there is not only the initial direct effect, but a               
secondary effect that takes place during physician-patient interactions.        
“Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising: Therapeutic or Toxic” outlines the        
59 I. ​Rossow ​ and J.G. Bramness, “The total sale of prescription drugs with an abuse potential predicts the 
number of excessive users: a national prescription database study” ​Biomed Central Public Health​ 25 no. 
15 (March 2015): 288. 
60G. L. Cvetanovich, P. N. Chalmers, and B. R. Bach. “Industry Financial Relationships in Orthopaedic 
Surgery: Analysis of the Sunshine Act Open Payments Database and Comparison with Other Surgical 
Subspecialties.” ​The Journal of Bone & Joint Surgery​ 97, no. 15 (August 2015): 1288–1295. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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structure and consequences of this strategy. “​The Role of Direct-to-Consumer          63
Pharmaceutical Advertising in Patient Consumerism” provides a concise and helpful          
summary of this phenomenon. This mediating factor is not included in this study’s             64
models. Similarly, the purchasing power at the county-level is not examined. To be             
clear, neither the impact of direct-to-consumer advertising nor the ability of consumers            
to purchase drugs is fully captured by the aggregate variables (eg. median income)             
included in the current analysis. 
 
4.0 VISUALIZING VARIABLES AND WRANGLING DATA 
Mortality, drug marketing, and demographic variables make up the core of this analysis.             
There are several measures of mortality that are considered here. Each form is a distinct               
way of measuring death from drug poisoning. Drug marketing is categorized according            
to the types of drugs being marketed. And demographic variables are included in order              
to paint a picture of mortality and marketing across social groups. All of the relevant               
variables are aggregated at the county-level. Of course, counties themselves do not die             
or advertise the latest painkiller. In the absence of individual-level data on prescribing             
patterns, drug sales, and drug consumption, the county serves as a bridge between             
marketing and death. For the county-level comparison to be meaningful, counties must            
be heterogeneous, and in many ways they are heterogeneous. Nonetheless, the           
aggregation presents analytical difficulties. 
 
In order to operationalize the relationship between drug marketing and drug mortality, I             
first turned to the OPP 2013 records. The 2013 records are comprised of payments or               
gifts from a pharmaceutical company to a physician made between July and December             
of 2013. Each record, among other variables about the transaction, contains an address             
which includes a state. By aggregating this data to the state-level (N=51, includes             
Washington D.C.), it was integrated with several state-level mortality datasets from           
CDC WONDER Multiple Cause of Death, 1999-2013 requests. 
63 C.L. Ventola. “Direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising: therapeutic or toxic?” ​Pharmacy and 
Therapeutics ​ 36 no. 10 (2011):669-684. 
64 B. Wang and A.S. Kesselheim,  “The role of direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising in patient 
consumerism.”​ Virtual Mentor ​ 15 no. 11 (2013): 960–965. 
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4.1  INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
The relationships between social capital, income inequality, and mortality are 
well-documented in public health literature. Irrespective of gross income and wealth, 
economic inequality has been found to be strongly correlated with mortality in the 
United States and elsewhere. By utilizing the Robin Hood Index, a measure of income 
inequality which examines the distribution of income by calculating a perfect 
redistribution from those living above mean income to those below, a Harvard School of 
Public Health study found that, “income inequality leads to an increase in mortality via 
a divestment in social capital.”  More recently, comprehensive reviews of the 65
income-inequality-mortality literature have been compiled; one such review in ​Social 
Epidemiology ​, includes three distinct and sociological theories and a substantial body of 
evidence linking the two.  66
 
In the current study, income inequality is operationalized as a county-level Gini 
coefficient and included as a covariate in the regression analysis. Gini measures of 
inequality have been subject to methodological criticism for glossing over the structure 
of inequality, reducing it to a single measure. Alternatively, measures of income 
inequality examining deciles or the aforementioned Robin Hood Index have been 
developed. They are not employed here. Moreover, a measure of wealth is not included 
as a covariate. Importantly, wealth in the United States reveals greater discrepancies in 
economic inequality, especially along racial lines, due to a long history of economic, 
social, and political disenfranchisement.  
 
4.2  HEALTH COVERAGE: SMALL AREA HEALTH INSURANCE ESTIMATES 
Relying on U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE) data,            
which is comprised of hierarchical, Bayesian modified, estimates of health insurance           
coverage across demographic groupings, the current analysis provides a series of           
Pearson product-moment correlations and multiple regressions to better understand the          
65 Ichirō Kawachi, B.P. Kennedy, K. Lochner, and D. Prothrow-Stith, "Social Capital, Income Inequality, 
and Mortality." ​American Journal of Public Health​ 87 no. 9​ ​(September 1997):1491-8. 
66 Lisa F. Berkman, Ichirō Kawachi, and M. Maria,​ Social Epidemiology.​ 2nd ed. New York: Oxford 
University Press (2014): Pages 126-147. 
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relationship between healthcare and drug-related mortality. The U.S. Census maintains          
the data, “can be used to analyze geographic variation in health insurance coverage, as              
well as disparities in coverage by race/ethnicity, sex, age and income levels that reflect              
thresholds for state and federal assistance programs.”  67
 
The insurance data includes the following sociologically relevant demographic         
descriptors: (1) age is provided in 5 categories, under 65, 18-64, 40-64, 50-64, and              
under 19, (2) race is given categorically as follows: all races, white alone, black alone,               
hispanic, (3) sex is provided as: both sexes, male, and female, (4) income is listed               
relative to the poverty line at rates of 138%, 200%, 250%, 400%, and between 138%               
and 400%.  68
 
4.3 OPIOID AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG MORTALITY 
Data from a CDC WONDER Multiple Cause of Death, 1999-2014 Request provides the             
basis for the preliminary state-level analysis as well as the subsequent county-level            
analysis. ​The OPP data contains 1,809 unique entries in 2013 for marketed drugs or              
medical devices and 2,698 uniques in 2014 and a total of 3,398 unique entries between               
the years. Each drug or device was individually assessed to determine its risk for abuse. 
 
 
2013 & 2014 CDC Drug Poisoning Mortality Per 100,000 Residents  69
67United States CDC. "Drug Poisoning Mortality: United States, 1999–2014. NCHS Data Visualization 
Pilot". Accessed June 7, 2016. http://blogs.cdc.gov/nchs-data-visualization/drug-poisoning-mortality/. 
68 U.S. Census Bureau, “Small Area Health Insurance Estimates. 2013 & 2014” Accessed March 1, 2016. 
http://www.census.gov/did/www/sahie/ [citing full paragraph] 
69 ​United States CDC. "Drug Poisoning Mortality: United States, 1999–2014. NCHS Data Visualization 
Pilot". Accessed June 7, 2016. http://blogs.cdc.gov/nchs-data-visualization/drug-poisoning-mortality/. 
 
Leamy 24 
 
Each of the 3,398 unique entries were searched in the U.S. National Library of Medicine               
PubMed database made available by The National Center for Biotechnology          
Information and classified according to its documented potential for abuse. Drugs           70
were assigned risk abuse status in the following categories: Risk Not Identified, Other,             
Medical Device or Non-Pharmaceutical Medical Product, Low Risk/Interest, Moderate         
Risk/Interest, Opioids, Barbiturates, Benzodiazepines, Stimulants. Drugs with abuse        
potential that are used in the treatment of serious disease and illness like cancer and               
HIV/AIDS are categorized as Low Risk in order to avoid misleading effects on             
mortality. 
 
Other studies concerned with prescription, illicit, and alcohol related mortality have           
included indirect causes in mortality count and rate calculations; for example, cirrhosis            
of the liver, a condition associated with extensive and prolonged alcohol use, has been              
included in studies of alcohol related mortality. This analysis excludes these           71
additional causes. This is because the pharmacological and ischemic (restriction of           
blood supply) preconditioning of distal and peripheral organs is an observed           
consequence of prolonged opioid use in other mammals, meaning that while habitual            
opioid users may be more inclined to overdose, they might be comparatively            
70 ​U.S. National Library of Medicine PubMed. Web.​ ​https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed​; 
Documentation of drug schedules/classifications available to researchers on request. 
71 ​Anne Case and Angus Deaton, "Rising Morbidity and Mortality in Midlife among White Non-Hispanic 
Americans in the 21st Century." ​ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences ​112, no. 49 (2015): 
15078-15083. 
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physiologically resistant to organ failure (ie. heart attack). By excluding these           72
additional causes of mortality the dependent mortality measure might more precisely           
and accurately account for prescription drug related mortality, but this precision comes            
at the expense of statistical power given the reduction of cases included. However, some              
nonexclusive-opioid causes of mortality are included. Due to the strong relationship           
between opioid and other prescription drug use and marketing, and the need for             
statistically significant mortality counts, all prescription drug related mortality is          
included in the operationalization of the dependent, mortality variable. 
 
A limitation of aggregating opioid marketing into a single category is that such a              
procedure does not account for the potential mitigating impact that drugs like            
methadone, an opioid substituted for heroin by many recovering heroin addicts, have on             
other types of opioid mortality. A 2015 study conducted across the Republic of Ireland              
—the occupied territory in the North excluded— indicates that taken as a whole, the              
effect methadone is a decrease in mortality. In this study, methadone is not included in               73
the marketing data, but other opioids that could have a similar impact are included              
because when the study was conducted, no existing research which evidences this effect             
in other opioids. 
 
On a relevant note, it is important to mention that the death certificates, from which               
mortality records are assembled, do not typically include the specific drug associated            
with death. Additionally, county-level mortality records are based on the county of            
residency at the time of death, not the place in which death was pronounced. This could                
present biases in areas where those using prescription opioids are likely to travel             
frequently or in association with drug use. 
 
Opioid identification poses methodological difficulties because determining what        
constitutes an opioid is not limited to molecular structure, botanical origin, or            
72 Takayuki Miki, Michael V. Cohen, and James M. Downey. "Opioid Receptor Contributes to Ischemic 
Preconditioning through Protein Kinase C Activation in Rabbits." ​Myocardial Ischemia and Reperfusion 
(1998): 3-12. 
73Gráinne Cousins, Fiona Boland, Brenda Courtney, Joseph Barry, Suzi Lyons, and Tom Fahey. "Risk of 
Mortality on and off Methadone Substitution Treatment in Primary Care: A National Cohort Study." 
Addiction ​111, no. 1 (2015): 73-82.  
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biochemical function alone. In a brief telephone interview with a representative of the             
United States’ Food and Drug Administration, the representative claimed that no           
comprehensive list of prescription opioids is made publically available. Moreover, they           
suggested that if such information was of interest, one might be able to obtain it through                
a legal request colloquially referred to as a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request              
and that the processing time would be dependent on the amount of information that              
would need to be redacted. 
 
County and state mortality rates labeled as ‘unreliable’ in the data obtained via CDC              
WONDER requests were included in the regression analysis for two reasons. The            
‘unreliable’ labeling is an automatic procedure which is based on assumptions about the             
application of the data. Their ‘unreliable’ label is dependent on the population of the              
county in which they occurred. While mortality rates in low population, rural, counties             
are subject to greater error variance, taken as a whole their relationship to prescription              
drug marketing is not inherently negligible. The lack of reliability is specific to the              
predictive capacity of the mortality rate data in longitudinal applications. The current            
study employs a cross-sectional approach. Moreover, there is no reason to suspect the             
reporting of these deaths is procedurally unreliable. Omitting these deaths from the            
analysis would create an urban bias. These data are not statistically inferred, but             
represent actual reported deaths. 
 
4.4 GEOCODING, LINKAGE, AND AGGREGATION OF DATA 
The initial dealings with the Open Payments were concerned with linking the data to              
geospatial, socially, and politically defined areas. This geocoding process was          
performed with the intent of producing a helpful county-level dataset linked to            
county-level health outcomes. Simply, each record of a financial transaction between a            
doctor and a pharmaceutical company has an associated address, but this information            
does not include a county. Counties have both names and identification numbers. An             
effort was made to assign both name and identification number to each financial record.              
To do this a latitude and a longitude was assigned to each record, and then that                
coordinate was located within the boundaries of the relevant space. 
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Moreover, some of the financial records have incorrect or incompatible geospatial           
information concerning an address, location, city, or state. For example, in a given             
financial record, a street address might not exist in the city or state named in that record.                 
In the 2013 general payments data, there were 5,484 records in which the address              
provided did not match any address existing in the state provided. These records have              
been omitted from the study. In the 2014 general payments data 1,588 records were              
subject to omission on the same grounds. All together, 7,072 records were omitted from              
the study for this reason. Four of these omitted records document the marketing of              
opioids. 
 
Given the size of the data and technological limitations, initially the geocoding efforts             
were conducted via a webtool yielding no matches utilizing two random samples (n =              
1,000) of addresses from the general payments 2013 dataset. Subsequent geocoding           
attempts resulted in significant attrition in usable records due to their returning of             
“no-match” (missing values) for latitude and longitude. The missing values occurred           
due to a limitation in the functionality of an application programing interface which was              
unable to process superfluous address-related information included in queries. By          
restructuring address data, the number of results missing records was reduced to 41 in              
both samples (n = 1,000). 
 
In an effort to produce greater usable records the addresses were further recoded. This              
was accomplished by selecting the address variable to be geocoded by the first             
appearing numeric value. In other words, the address variable selected for geocoding            
was selected dependent on the value type of the first character in its field. This recoding                
resulted in missing values of 33 and 27 from the two aforementioned cohort-style             
samples (n = 1,000). Additional measures were taken, including recoding informed by            
United States Postal Service’s (USPS) complete list of street types, and the removal of              
“STE” and “Suite” from the addresses. The USPS-informed measures produced greater           
missing values (NA = 58 & 47) and the “STE” correction measures produced a              
relatively small change (NA = 32 & 28) accompanied by further complications. Thus,             
the original, value-based recode method was selected for application to the larger data             
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set. For the purpose of reproducibility, the complete R script, commentary, and            
statistical analysis is published online.  74
 
The missing address data is treated as missing at random (MAR), though it should be               
noted that causal explanations for missingness are plausible. The ‘no-match’ returns           
tended towards longer addresses with greater complexity. Cursory observations of          
missing addresses suggest addresses containing “P.O box” and “STE”, in addition to            
misspellings and incidental typing mistakes are to account for the majority of missing             
addresses. Given the large volume of data and minimal attrition of records, imputation             
methods are deemed unnecessary as it pertains to record loss. The attrition of payment              
cases, consequent the aforementioned imperfect geocoding process and assumed to be           
MAR, totals an approximate $595,529,141 in expenditures, 6.077% of the total reported            
amount of approximately $9.92 billion. 
 
4.5 PHARMACEUTICAL ABUSE-POTENTIAL CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURE 
Narrowing the scope of the study to high-risk and abuse-heavy pharmaceuticals required            
that the drugs being marketed in the 2013 and 2014 Open Payments data be identified.               
This was accomplished by writing an R-script that identified all unique values listed in              
the general payments data under the five categories containing drug names. According            
to this procedure ​1,809 unique entries in 2013 and 2,698 unique entries in 2014 were               
observed. Between the two datasets 3,398 unique entries were observed. It is important             
to note, ‘unique entries’ is to mean exactly that, unique strings of data. For example, the                
drug Jentadueto may appear multiple times in the data as “Jentadueto”,           
“JENTADUETO”,  and “Linagliptin / Metformin”. 
 
These 3,398 drugs, medical devices, medical procedures, and other entries were           
classified primarily according to their opioid status. Opiate derivatives, opiate          
synthetics, and other abuse prone pharmaceuticals like barbiturates and amphetamines          
comprised the minority of entries by unique value. The majority of the entries by unique               
value were not for pharmaceuticals at all, but instead medical procedures and sometimes             
ambiguous subjects with seemingly little medical relevance. These are classified as not            
74 GitHub. 
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identified, in clinical trial, topical and dermatological, over-the-counter        
(non-prescription), or medical device or procedure. Another category, other, was used           
for other biological materials like blood, and abstract entries like ‘education’ and            
‘default’, and plants. An additional category comprised of ‘low-risk’ for abuse           
pharmaceuticals contains a range of drugs including: all cancer specific drugs, HIV            
drugs, vaccinations, Hepatitis B medications, Multiple Sclerosis medications, other         
antivirals, drugs for hypertension, drugs for asthma, blood disorders, cholesterol          
medications, antibacterials and antifungals, drugs to prevent organ and limb rejection,           
local anesthetics like lidocaine, drugs primarily used for contraceptive purposes, most           
NSAIDs, end-stage of life drugs, smoking cessation medications, some atypical          
antipsychotics, and ophthalmic solutions. Even drugs with relatively high abuse          
potential are included here if they are primarily used in people with serious and fatal               
medical conditions. 
 
Drug categories of comparatively greater interest include one labeled, ‘Moderate or           
Possible Risk’ which contains some antipsychotics, synthetic testosterone, some         
sedatives, and some sleep aids. Additional high risk categories are stimulants, opiates,            
benzodiazepines, barbiturates, and —a possible mediating category— drugs used in          
opiate addiction treatment. One additional category, ‘unknown’, was used throughout          
the categorization process for drugs that were not readily classified according to their             
abuse potential. Each drug was manually checked ​via a Google application against            
databases made available by the United States Food and Drug Administration, the U.S.             
National Library of Medicine, U.S. ​National Institutes of Health, U.S. National Cancer            
Institute, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the World Health           
Organization and ClinicalTrials.gov. Drugs and medical devices not found in these           
databases were classified according to information made available by the manufacturer           
or classified as unidentified. No pharmaceuticals without substantial supporting         
evidence were included in any of the ‘high risk’ categories (ie. opiates, barbiturates,             
benzodiazepines). However, due to possible researcher error, drugs with high-risk for           
abuse may have been improperly classified as low-risk. Drugs which were not found in              
the aforementioned databases were identified according to pharmacologic composition.         
In other words, the data are organized so it is very unlikely to infer a connection                
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between drug marketing and mortality that has no empirical or ontological basis, but an              
existing connection could be easily missed. 
 
This classification procedure presents a significant limitation to the study because the            
pharmacokinetics of the respective pharmacological substances are not central to the           
study. Drugs which might be correlated with abuse and act on opiate receptors might              
have been unintentionally excluded from the current study. Some antiepileptic drugs,           
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, certain antidepressants, and other        
pharmaceuticals with known risks are excluded from moderate and high risk           
classification despite their clinically observed association with high risk behavior and           
suicide. This also presents a significant limitation to the study. 
 
4.6 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Before discussing opioid marketing data, it will be helpful to give a brief overview of               
relevant socioeconomic factors. These data come mostly from national censusing. In the            
United States, health uninsurance and unemployment rates are mostly consistent across           
highly populated and less populated areas, varying by only a few percentage points.             
That is to say, whether one lives in a city or a rural environment is not a great indicator                   
of employment or health insurance status. Of course, there is variation within types of              
paid work performed by city dwellers relative to their counterparts working in less             
populated settings. 
 
Median income, however, is much higher in urban centers. American households in            
highly populated urban areas report about $14,000 more in annual income than the             
national mean. Income inequality as measured by a Gini coefficient, is somewhat higher             
in highly populated areas. 
 
The descriptive statistics contain important characteristics. For example, there are more           
than twice as many doctors in highly urbanized counties relative to their less urbanized              
counter-parts. In 2013 and 2014, for every one prescription opioid death in an urban              
population there were nearly two deaths in the general population. Yet, when all types              
of drug deaths are examined, the ratio is closer to 1:1. Also, the stratification of formal                
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educational attainment is apparent. This stratification appears across and within urban           
and non-urban settings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013 Uninsured Rates  75
 
 
 
 
75United States CDC SAHIE uninsured aggregate 2013 and 2014 data mapped in RStudio with ggplot. 
Some county codes are inconsistent with the original data source and must be manually corrected for 
county-level mapping. They are (1) St. Martin, Louisiana (2) Currituck, North Carolina (3) Okaloosa, 
Florida (4) Galveston, Texas (5) Accomack, Virginia (6) Pierce, Washington (7) San Juan, Washington 
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The pharmaceutical marketing dataset used in this study only includes drugs, devices,            
biologicals, and medical supplies covered by some form of Medicare or Medicaid. In             
other words, some form of the U.S. national government’s health insurance scheme            
must cover the drug in order for it to appear in this study. There certainly are drugs that                  
fall outside of the scope of these public insurance programs. And there is every reason               
to expect that pharmaceutical companies market these drugs to physicians and           
consumers. However, the bias presented by this is not accounted for by analytical             
procedures. 
 
As it concerns specific causes of mortality at the county level, tabulations or counts of               
less than 10 are omitted in order to maintain anonymity of deceased persons, their              
families, associates, etc. For example, if 2 people in Absaroka County, Wyoming were             
trampled to death by giraffes, this data would be omitted from the dataset because it               
would be easy to identify the trampled persons. Therefore, subgroup analysis at the             
county-level would be difficult using this dataset. However, subgroup analysis of the            
data at the state-level, in high population counties, and in large metropolitan areas             
remains statistically powerful because these regions are not subject to the           
aforementioned suppression. Here subgroup is intended to refer to any coherent social            
group other than the general population of an area. 
 
Of the total 240,868 cases of research payments recorded in the 2013 Open Payments              
data, 197,547 were payments made to non-covered entities. In these cases, the            
non-covered entity has some association with a covered entity or covered doctor. Of the              
reported 2013 payments, less than .002% (n=346) of payments were made outside of the              
United States. Given the multinational nature of the marketers in question, this data is              
not likely to help paint a picture of their international payments at large. 
 
The 2013 general payments includes 1,314 unique payers totaling $971,973,670          
(applicable manufacturers or group purchasing organizations), almost all of these          
payments were made in the United States or its ‘territories’. In Puerto Rico, which was               
not included in this study, 2013 general payments totaled $3,209,688. In sum            
—payments in ​de facto colonies eg. American Samoa and Guam— $3,214,070 in            
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payments are excluded in addition to $6,069 that remain unaccounted for at the             
state-level. Notably, in the 2013 general payments 4,055,634 transactions were recorded           
and though these are not employed directly in my analysis, they are used in other similar                
studies as independent variables. The 2013 research payments total $1,552,650,054          76
made by 527 unique payers. In the 2013 ownership and research payments, all payments              
were accounted for at the state-level. Given the values of these payments relative to total               
expenditures, these missing values are of minimal concern. Notably, no ownership           
payments were observed in Hawaii or Alaska. The research payments data contains            
$2,976,836 in expenditures in Puerto Rico which were excluded. 
 
4.7 VARIABLE AND DATA SUMMARY 
Mortality data (noted as ​mortalityA​, see appendix ​1) is derived from a CDC WONDER              
Multiple Cause of Death, 1999-2013 request provides the basis for the preliminary            
state-level analysis. The data used in the current analysis is public-use data, however, it              
should be noted that restricted-use forms are available and contain more comprehensive            
county-level measures.  
 
In sum, 35 variables, some as aggregates (eg. drug name and NDC), across all datasets               
(6) provided via the OPP and through the U.S. Center for Disease Control’s data system               
the Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (CDC WONDER) requests,          
are used in the analysis. The CDC WONDER data are composed of mortality figures              
grouped according to the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision,          
Clinical Modification (ICD-10-CM, U.S. American Revision) coding system and by          
county or county-equivalent geospatial region. In short, the data are composed of            
variables concerning how pharmaceuticals are marketed, where they are marketed, and           
the health outcomes of populations in the aforementioned areas. Unfortunately, when           
this study was originally conducted, the nationally representative data concerning health           
outcomes (eg. hospitalization) only extended through 2013, so these could not be used             
as reliable dependent variables. The marketing data in question were only captured            
76Scott E. Hadland, Ariadne Rivera-Aguirre, Brandon D. L. Marshall, and Magdalena Cerdá,​ “Association 
of Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing of Opioid Products With Mortality From Opioid-Related 
Overdoses.” ​JAMA Network Open ​2 no. 1 (January 2019). 
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during 2013 and 2014. The mortality data comes from the same period, from 2013 and               
2014. The analysis does not lag mortality which is an important limitation of the study.               
No longitudinal analysis of the data which might attempt to establish causality between             
health outcomes and marketing was performed. 
 
5.0 ANALYSIS 
In the initial exploratory analysis, state and county-level per capita direct-to-physician           
marketing expenditures were calculated using population data from the 2010 U.S.           
Census Regional and Demographic Data and treating the 2013 and 2014 OPP data as              
cross-sectional by grouping ownership, research, and general payments from 2013, with           
their respective counterparts in 2014. Thus, the calculated product is indicative of per             
capita expenditures by county for a 17 month period beginning in August of 2013 and               
extending to December of 2014. Given that the population data used during this             
preliminary and exploratory analysis is from the 2010 U.S. Census, population change            
between these periods (2010 and 2014) is unaccounted for using this procedure.            
Subsequent analyses in this study employ population estimates for 2014 as given by the              
U.S. Census. 
 
Public health researchers in the United States employ a number of International            
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-10-CM) coding         
procedures to account for prescription drug related mortality. Generally, these          
procedures include categorizations for intentional and unintentional overdoses, adverse         
effects, and assaults involving drugs. Additionally, coding procedures often incorporate          
the use of illicit (non-prescription) drug use. The ICD-10-CM procedure was used in             77
the coding of prescription drug-related death. ​(see appendix I) 
 
Per capita expenditures for 2013 general payments, ownership payments, and research           
payments were calculated using the US Census 2013 state estimates. Pearson's           
correlations between per capita expenditures and prescription drug related mortality per           
100,000 were performed yielding no statistically significant effects for general          
77 Prescription Drug Overdose Team, CDC. “Prescription Drug Overdose Data & Statistics: Guide to 
ICD-9-CM AND ICD-10-CM Codes Related to Poisoning and Pain”(12 August 2013). 
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payments or open payments, and a moderately high inverse correlation between           
research payments and crude mortality (r =  -.334, p < 0.05, N=51).  
 
Correlation matrices were constructed and significant relationships were observed.         
Taken causally, they suggest direct-to-physician marketing yields improved health         
outcomes (i.e. life expectancy). While theoretical implications were considered, notably          
the notion that marketing prescription drugs to physicians constitutes a form of            
continuing professional education and improves physician performance, this explanation         
might be an inadequate simplification. Alternatively, a spurious relationship between          
direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing, income, and health outcomes was        
postulated. After further examination of the data in the form of a multiple regression, it               
was determined that median household income, when included in the regression,           
accounts for much of the variance in mortality at the state-level. 
 
Though these analyses are telling, they do not insufficiently address the core questions             
of this research project. In order to address the shortcomings, a multiple Poisson             
regression and a log-transformed regression were used. Moreover, marketing payments          
for non-opioid drugs were subsequently excluded, and instead only marketing payments           
for selected opioid drugs were included. The state-level analysis was eliminated and a             
county-level analysis was conducted. 
 
These exploratory analyses rely on the assumption that the data at hand is normally              
distributed. Most variables are normally distributed, however, they are not all normally            
distributed. In particular, per capita payments were examined for normality and it was             
determined that they are non-parametrically distributed according to a graphical plot and            
a Shapiro-Wilk test. Therefore, the exploratory findings should be approached with           
caution. Additionally, West Virginia appears as an outlier with an illicit and prescription             
drug poisoning crude mortality rate of 48 per 100,000 inhabitants, well over twice the              
median rate. Nonetheless, it is included in the analysis. 
 
Normality testing and visual examination of graphical representations of some of the            
control variables (eg. education variables, median household income, rates of          
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(un)insurance, etc.) indicates relative normality of the data. The distribution of           
payments and mortality data, however, creates cause for concern as it pertains to the              
assumption of normality. 
 
The state-level expenditures were calculated with post-attrition data by using Federal           
Information Processing Standard Publication (FIPS) codes contained within previously         
constructed county-level aggregate expenditures. Notably, an approximate 6% of cases          
and at least $52 million in payments, were excluded from the analysis. These missing              
cases were treated as MAR. Given the nonparametric distribution of these data further             
analysis is required. 
 
The inverse correlation found between research payments and mortality might be           
explained by a consequence of error, the MAR assumption, or difficulties that occurred             
in the data aggregation process. It might also be attributable to a spurious factor              
accounted for by median income or wealth. Additionally, it might be due to a beneficial               
public health effect spurring from private investment in pharmaceutical research. These           
explanations suggest a need for thorough evaluation of the structuring and analytical            
process, and potentially the incorporation of mediating factors. 
 
In summary, the following three findings are particularly helpful for further examination            
of the data: 
1. The state-level aggregation of the data is not wholly sufficient for the purposes             
of this study because too much heterogeneity is lost. Therefore, county-level           
analysis is needed. 
2. The assumption of MAR might be wrong. Missing records could be a            
consequence of systematic bias. 
3. Measures of income, wealth, and/or other socioeconomic data might be needed           
to explain the observed correlation and mediate for spurious relationships. 
 
Nonetheless, the state-level payments were aggregated from the original Open Payments           
files and Pearson’s correlations were performed using the 2013 general payments,           
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research payments, and ownership payments as they relate to crude mortality rates as             
defined by the aforementioned coding procedure. 
 
State-Level Drug Poisoning Mortality and Aggregate Industry-Physician Payments 
Correlations 
 r p-value 
General Payments -0.2744 0.0513 
Research Payments -0.3405 0.0145 
Ownership Payments -.0536 .7147 
 
Due to differences in prescribing patterns across physician types, payments to           
physicians were aggregated by type and correlated via the Pearson product-moment           
method with mortality. None of the correlations were found to be statistically significant             
in accordance with the (.05) convention.  
 
Six (6) physician types were identified in the dataset. Medical doctors, ostephathists,            
chiropractic, dentistry, optometry, podiatry. $236,673,912 in payments were not         
assigned to physicians, but instead to teaching hospitals. 
 
State-Level Payments by Physician Type and Mortality by Drug Poisoning 
Correlations 
Physician Type 
Total 
Payment % payments r p-value 
Other (Teaching Hospital) $236,723,298 0.2436 -0.2636 0.0617 
Chiropractor $77,774 0.00008 0.15611 0.3002 
Doctor of Dentistry $27,684,117 0.02848 -0.0357 0.8035 
Doctor of Optometry $9,214,477 0.0095 0.0716 0.6177 
Doctor of Osteopathy $22,164,911 0.0228 0.1547 0.2785 
Doctor of Podiatric Medicine $5,611,244 0.0058 -0.2039 0.1512 
Medical Doctor $670,497,848 0.6898 -0.2494 0.0775 
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For each physician type and for teaching hospitals, per capita expenditures by state were              
computed. Subsequently, a Pearson’s correlation was performed. No physician type was           
found to be correlated with crude ​mortalityA at a statistically significant level. Three             
“Covered Recipient Types” were observed in the research payments dataset. “Covered           
Recipient Physician”, “Covered Teaching Hospital”, and “Non-covered Recipients        
entities”. 
 
Covered Recipient Types and Mortality by Drug Poisoning Correlations 
 N % r p-value 
Covered Recipient Physician 15967 0.06629 -0.1357 0.3473 
Covered Recipient Teaching   
Hospital 27354 0.11356 -0.2120 0.1395 
Non-covered Recipient Entity 197547 0.82015 -0.3111 0.0279 
 
Only non-covered recipient entities were found to be correlated with ​mortalityA at the             
chosen significance level (CI=95%). Mostly, “non-covered recipient entities” are         
private health clinics and research organizations. One explanation for this relationship is            
that private healthcare organizations are most likely to target patients covered by            
insurance, with financial resources, and exist in close physical proximity to the target             
populations, which happen to have generally better health outcomes. As a matter of             
understanding this relationship, further investigation into factors relating to ​mortalityA          
is needed.  
 
5.1 DISTRIBUTION AND OVERDISPERSION OF KEY VARIABLES 
Linearity, statistical independence, homoscedasticity, and normality of data are required          
if the inferences made from the multivariate linear regression are to be valid. The              
overdispersion of opioid payments at the county-level threatens the required          
assumptions for modeling the data according to conventional multivariate linear          
regression. Given that the outcome measure used in this study is mortality, a form of               
count, rate, or event data, Poisson regression, a generalized linear model, was selected             
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due to its appropriateness in analyzing data in count and rate form. In this case, that                
count and rate data takes the form of incidents of mortality which are independently              
observed and follow a Poisson distribution. The types of both the dependent and             
independent variables here are compatible with Poisson regression. However, in order to            
employ Poisson regression, the distribution of the data must not be overly dispersed             
where the observed variance is significantly greater than expected variance. Unlike           
standard linear regression, in which estimated variance is determined from a parameter            
which is independent of the mean, in generalized linear models like Poisson regression,             
the variance and mean are interrelated based on the model’s structure. Thus, certain             
assumption tests are required. The data’s dispersion was determined by calculating the            
mean, observed and expected variance, and a Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistic as a means            
of testing the parametric/nonparametric distribution of each of the CDC WONDER sets            
of rate/count mortality data. 
 
A more expansive, but less precise, mortality dataset comprised of intervals of mortality             
rates was treated initially as an ordinal dependent variable and analyzed via ordinal             
regression models. However, this approach does not account for uncertainty pertaining           
to the variation within a given interval, instead relying on a midpoint. Provided by the               
CDC, the data has undergone both left and right censoring as well as interval censoring               
and thus requires analysis with interval regression. 
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County-Level, Age-Adjusted, Drug Poisoning Deaths Per 100,000 
 
 
The most complete drug poisoning data made publically available is truncated, with 
deaths of greater than 20 per 100,000 being grouped into a single category. Therefore, 
as seen in the histogram above, there is a heavy right skew.  
 
Population-estimated error margins for Gini index estimates, uninsurance rate estimates,          
and demographic estimates are unaccounted for in the regression analyses. The           
explanatory variables’ variance errors are assumed to be uncorrelated and orthogonal           
relative to the error variance assumed by the model. 
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Examining the Pearson’s correlation matrix, it can be seen that in the most populated              
100 counties, all forms of mortality included in the data set —that is mortality from               
prescription drug overdoses, mortality from all prescription drugs, and mortality from           
all drugs— are significantly (p <. 05) correlated with the amount of money spent per               
doctor on opioid marketing. However, the correlation is low to moderate (about .20 to              
.30) and it is specific to more common opioid products and not especially potent ones.               
Other significant correlations can be observed which might be expected. For example,            
all drug mortality is significantly correlated with the level of education at all levels              
included in the study; a county’s rate of high school completion or completion of “some               
college” only, both being positively correlated with all drug mortality, and rate of             
college completion being inversely related to all drug mortality. This finding is            
consistent with existing literature on overdose mortality in the U.S.  78
 
6.0 RESULTS 
In the simple multivariate regression models, the lack of health insurance is a reliable              
predictor of drug-related mortality both at the nationwide county and the urban level.             
However, these models suggest that uninsurance appears to have opposite effects at the             
county and urban levels. Whereas uninsurance is associated with a significant increase            
in drug mortality at the county-level, uninsurance is associated with a significant            
decrease in drug mortality in major urban areas. To give a problematic and overly              
simplified example which corresponds to these models, if you are living in a major U.S.               
city and have health insurance, you are about 20% less likely to die from a drug                
overdose relative to the “average” person in the same setting. However, generally            
speaking, if you are living in the U.S. and have health insurance, you are more likely to                 
die from a drug overdose. One possible explanation for the latter phenomenon is that              
people with health insurance are more likely to have access to drugs. Similarly,             
unemployment rates are good predictors of drug mortality at the county-level. Greater            
unemployment is closely and significantly associated with greater drug mortality.          
78 For example, see “The impact of opioid use disorder on levels of educational attainment: Perceived 
benefits and consequences” by Matthew S. Ellis et. al. in ​Drug and Alcohol Dependence​. (January 2020). 
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However, in the multivariate regressions and most of the other models, median income             
is not significantly associated with drug-related mortality. Interestingly, this finding is           
consistent with existing public health literature concerning drug mortality. Whereas          79
other economic measures of individual and household wellbeing, like house value and            
income inequality are associated with drug mortality, median household income is not.            80
My analysis also finds that income inequality captured according to a Gini coefficient,             
however, is a significant predictor of drug mortality, but the best evidence for income              
inequality is at the urban level. In other words, the multivariate regressions suggest that              
income inequality is a good predictor of mortality, but this is mostly limited to densely               
populated areas. Educational variables, which have been reliable predictors of opioid           
mortality in other studies, were not found to be a significant predictor of drug mortality               
in these simple multivariate regressions. In the correlation tables, the presence of            81
physicians relative to the general population reveals a significant and positive           
correlation to prescription drug mortality (r = .21, p <.05). Similarly, in the multiple              
regression, there is a statistically significant relationship between physicians per          
100,000 and drug mortality, however, with the other variables introduced into the            
model, the observed relationship is very small. 
 
Controlling for demographic factors, the simple multivariate regressions suggest that the           
marketing dollar amount spent both per capita and per doctor are statistically significant             
predictors of overdose mortality at the county-level. More specifically, for every           
additional dollar spent on opioid marketing per capita at the county level, ​model 2              
predicts an increase in drug-related mortality of about 3.5 people per 100,000. However,             
that finding should be read cautiously because the mean spending ​per capita is only              
about $.01, so an increase of opioid marketing expenditures to $1 per capita would              
represent a 100 fold increase in opioid marketing expenditures. Nonetheless, because of            
79 James R. Langabeer, Kimberly A. Chambers, Marylou Cardenas-Turanzas, and Tiffany 
Champagne-Langabeer, ​“ ​County-level factors underlying opioid mortality in the United States” 
Substance Abuse.​ (March 2020). 
80Ibid. 
81 These studies use comparatively nuanced methods for looking at educational attainment across social 
groupings, breaking up the educational attainment according to groupings like Spanish language speakers, 
men with a bachelor's degree over time, etc.  For an example, see Jessica Y. Ho’s 2017 article “The 
Contribution of Drug Overdose to Educational Gradients in Life Expectancy in the United States, 
1992–2011”  in ​Demography​. 
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the considerable variation in direct-to-physician opioid marketing across counties —the          
standard deviation is about 6 times the mean— the model suggests an important but              
small association between population-adjusted, opioid marketing expenditures and        
mortality from all drugs. Notably, these marketing predictors are not statistically           
significant in the simple multivariate regression models which examine urban districts           
alone. These findings might be cause to reject the null hypothesis, and claim that opioid               
marketing does, afterall, have an effect on opioid mortality, however, it is important to              
remember that these models are concerned with general drug mortality. When the            
dependent variable is changed to mortality coded for exclusively prescription drugs or            
opioids, statistical significance can no longer be found. Here, it is important to recall              
that the mortality data for prescription and drug overdose is poor. And, because of the               
non-normal distribution of the data, the validity of the multivariate models is            
questionable. 
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The Poisson regression can be interpreted very much like a standard, multivariate, linear             
regression. Most modeling software uses natural logarithmic log-link function and          
provides an exponentiated β in the output tables. If there is a change of “1” in the                 
explanatory variable, the change in the variable being explained can be understood by             
the given coefficient provided that all other variables in the model remain constant.             
However, the change in the dependent variable must be understood not simply as a              
change in the count or rate of mortality, but a change in the log of the count or rate of                    
mortality. Unlike multivariate, linear, regression, there is no reliable measure of model            
fit like R2 or Adjusted R2; a pseudo-R2 has been developed, but one is not included                
here because it is unreliable and mostly irrelevant for the purposes of this study. Though               
Poisson regression is most often used for modeling count data, it can also be used for                
modeling rate data, in this case various forms and rates of mortality at the county and                
urban levels. For example, looking at ​Model 4 in the regression summary labeled             
County-Level Multivariate Quasipossion​, for every one 1% increase in a county’s rate            
of uninsurance, the county’s drug overdose mortality log rate can be expected to             
increase by .022 per 100,000 people. Looking at the same model, it is also clear, for                
example, that an 1% increase in the whiteness of a county predicts the log rate of drug                 
mortality will increase by about .06 per 100,000 people. In this case, the drug mortality               
variable is a measure of deaths with a specific medical inclusion criteria (see ​Appendix              
I) per 100,000 at the county-level. Other covariates in this model can be interpreted              
following this reasoning. Notably, several covariates in the model do not qualify as             
statistically significant according to the .05 convention. 
 
The opioid marketing variables have a statistically significant effect on drug mortality.            
On average (mean), pharmaceutical companies spent about $20 marketing opioids to           
each doctor in a given county. Though statistically significant, the effect of marketing             
on all drug mortality is inconsequential however it is measured. Here, the controls are              
far better predictors of mortality. 
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Due to the heavy skewness of these predictors and requirement for normality in linear              
models, these regressors (see distributions above) were transformed by taking their           
natural log and regressing them on mortality variables. Both opioid mortality and            
prescription mortality were logarithmically transformed, but all drug mortality was not.           
The results of the models which examined both opioid and prescription mortality are not              
reported here, but can be found in the appendix. These results lack statistical             
significance and suggest, like the correlation matrix, some technical error in the            
construction of these variables in the database or register. This is the case for both               
models that both examine the log-transformed and standard forms of opioid and            
prescription mortality.  
 
However, following the logarithmic transformation of the independent variables, models 
were built which examined all drug mortality— the data for which is the most complete 
mortality data available in this study— and these models produced revealing and 
statistically significant results. Interpreting coefficients in a logarithmically transformed 
model is very much like reading a standard regression model, however, the 
interpretation depends on how the log-transformation was conducted. In this case, only 
the independent variables were log-transformed. Therefore, when reading the regression 
table, independent variables should be thought of in terms of a percentage change for 
every 1 unit increase in all drug mortality per 100,000. For example, in the log 
transformed regression below the coefficient in Model1 associated with uninsurance is 
.2854. This should be divided by 100 (0.2854/100 = 0.002854). Therefore, Model1 
suggests that for every 1 unit increase, —in this case that is a 1% increase— in 
uninsurance, all drug mortality increases by about .0029 per 100,000 (p  < .001). 
Coefficients throughout the table can be interpreted by following this procedure. 
Interestingly, and perhaps this is the most relevant finding which addresses my central 
research question, in all of the models at the county-level, all measures of 
direct-to-physician opioid marketing are significantly related to mortality, though the 
effect size is small. For example, a 100% increase in opioid marketing at the county 
level predicts an increase in drug mortality per 100,000 of about 0.4 or 0.5 (p  <. 001).  
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However, little statistical significance can be found in the log-transformed models 
which examine, exclusively, highly populated urban areas. In even the most robust of 
these models (see model 3 and model 6) only 3 or 4 of the 11 predictors reach 
significance (p < .05). 
 
The results of my analysis point to a plausible relationship between the key variables,              
but these findings are preliminary and do not lend themselves to clear and definite              
conclusions. Many of the models lack statistical significance, both at the county and             
urban levels. The lack of statistical significance could be due to a “true” null hypothesis,               
that marketing does not have an effect on mortality at the county-level. However, the              
“true” null hypothesis scenario does not make sense concerning demographic covariates           
like education which have a well-documented relationship to mortality at the county and             
urban level. The log-transformed model which examines drug mortality in all counties            
provides the best evidence for a relationship between direct-to-physician marketing and           
drug related death. There are probably several reasons for these shortcomings, and            
thanks to a more recent study published by public health researchers and physicians, we              
now have the results of a study which addresses most of this study’s important              
shortcomings. 
 
7.0 Discussion 
Several years after the data in the current study were compiled and analyzed, Scott E.               
Hadland, Ariadne Rivera-Aguirre, and Brandon D. L. Marshall —respectively, a public           
health professor and physician at Boston University, a public health researcher at New             
York University, and a public health professor at Brown University— produced a very             
similar study which addresses many of the limitations mentioned in my original            
analysis. The study was published in January of 2019 in Substance Use and Addiction              
and is titled ​Association of Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing of Opioid Products With            
Mortality From Opioid-Related Overdoses ​.  82
82 Scott E. Hadland, Ariadne Rivera-Aguirre, and Brandon D. L. Marshall, “Association of 
Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing of Opioid Products With Mortality From Opioid-Related Overdoses” 
Substance Use and Addiction​ 2 no. 1 (January 2019). 
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Relying on most of the same data sources and linking procedures as this study, their               
study also investigated county-level overdose mortality and pharmaceutical marketing.         
There are several important differences between the analytical procedures they          
employed, and the ones I employed here. First, they used overdose mortality data with a               
1-year lag, the assumption being it takes time for the impact of marketing to take effect.                
Again, the mortality data employed in my study are partially lagged, but only by a               
period of 6 months, and include 6 months which run concurrent to the marketing data.               
Hadland et. al. also had access to restricted use mortality data which is more complete,               
but which is unavailable to researchers affiliated exclusively with non-U.S. universities.           
Second, they used negative binomial regression to address the over-dispersion of the            
data, a procedure I had tried and failed to employ. Third, they accounted for prescribing               
patterns and used prescribing patterns as a mediating variable. When I originally            
conducted the analysis and compiled the data in this study, the prescribing data was not               
readily available and getting access to it was made prohibitively difficult due to time              
constraints, but more importantly, the most robust forms of this data are prohibitively             
expensive and are mostly sold to pharmaceutical companies. Fourth, in addition to            
examining the population-adjusted payments to doctors as a total dollar amount, they            
examined the gross number and frequency of payments to physicians. The impact of             
prolonged and repeated exposure to marketing efforts were not captured by my model             
and are only discussed in passing in the theoretical section of this paper. Fifth, and this                
is very important, Hadland et. al. included marketing payments for ​fentanyl in their             
analysis. At the time I was conducting the original analysis, the widespread “abuse” of              
fentanyl was just beginning to receive attention, and I had excluded it from my analysis               
because it was also being used to treat addiction to other opioids. Finally, the way               
Hadland et. al. employed controls, demographic covariates, etc. ensured greater          
heterogeneity among the covariates. For example, they did not reduce “race” to a single              
continuous category which I call “whiteness.” 
 
Hadland et. al. found a significant association between prescription opioid overdoses           
and opioid marketing at the county-level. They write that the, “greatest effect size was              
observed for the number of payments per capita, and the smallest effect size was              
 
Leamy 57 
observed for the marketing value in dollars per capita.” Moreover, they found that             
overdose mortality was also significantly associated with all county-level covariates,          
excluding one age variable, a finding that is not consistent with my analysis, which of               
course, uses a different and less-robust set of procedures. The mediation analysis, which             
examined the effects of prescribing rates on overdose mortality, found that prescribing            
rates could account for 3% to 26% of the observed overdose mortality. By looking at the                
total dollar amount spent on marketing only 3% of the overdose mortality is             
“explained”, but by looking at the number of physicians actually receiving payments, up             
to 26% of the overdose mortality can be explained. The researchers conclude by arguing              
that policymakers should consider regulating opioid marketing and pharmaceutical         
companies should consider voluntarily stopping the practice. 
 
7.1 ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There are possible systematic biases in the Open Payments reporting processes. The            
reporting process relies on the marketing (pharmaceutical) organizations to accurately,          
precisely, and earnestly report their activity. Due to possible financial consequences,           
marketing organizations might be hesitant to accurately report their activity. This is            
further substantiated by the broad opposition to the Open Payments Program by            
physicians, many of whom have objected to supposed pharma claims that they received             
payments. 
 
Opioids, including opioid analgesics, are thought to be helpful in the preconditioning of             
major bodily organs in such a way that might minimize the trauma caused by a major                
medical difficulty. In other words, the bodily effect of opioid analgesics might prepare             
the body for traumatic events (ie. organ failure). This phenomenon is important both in              
theoretical applications, but also in considering the current quantitative methodology          
which relies on mortality as a dependent outcome variable at the county-level. If the              
hypothesis that direct-to-physician opioid analgesic advertising results in greater         
consumption of opioid analgesics, and opioid analgesics have the capacity to improve            
longevity in long-term users that do not die from overdose, this presents some             
methodological challenges. In other words, it is entirely possible that greater opioid            
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analgesic consumption can conditionally improve life-expectancy while concurrently        
producing an increase in overall mortality due to overdose. 
 
8.0 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study has uncovered significant, but weak evidence supporting the association           
between direct-to-physician marketing and drug mortality. This evidence comes both          
from the original analysis, as well as more robust studies which have set out to address                
the same research questions since the analysis was conducted. On the whole, though the              
association is quite uncertain, it nonetheless suggests some relationship between opioid           
marketing and general drug mortality. One reason the data reveal no clear and definite              
relationship between marketing and mortality is because there are significant limitations           
in the analyses and the coding procedures, namely, prescribing patterns are included in             
the quantitative analysis. Fortunately, more comprehensive studies have included         
prescribing patterns and provide a strong case for a link between opioid mortality and              
direct-to-physician opioid marketing. 
 
Further research into direct-to-physician opioid and pharmaceutical marketing on public          
health and mortality can build from the findings of this project via several routes. First,               
future research can employ the reappropriated and alternative applications of existing,           
cleaned, pharma-financial data and methods presented in this study. Second, additional           83
research in this vein can build on the historical and interpretive findings by interrogating              
the effects of increased prescription opioid regulation and policy prior to the collection             
of the Open Payments data. Third, further research could improve on the analytical             
procedure employed in this study by calculating Bayesian estimates of age-adjusted           
mortality for the opioid and prescription drug mortality. Fourth, additional research           
might consider other nonparametric, log-transforming procedures, and negative        
binomial regression. 
 
83 See ​Appendix III​ or link below: 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1l2KisqcIMbxibydlSy99Fha97r3y_tLxipxOeUchYLM/edit?usp=s
haring 
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Another important consideration which this study mentions —but does not address           
analytically— is the commercial, legal, and illicit opioid distribution networks which           
are not restricted to county or state boundaries. These networks are an important             
mediating factor that is not accounted for in the models. For example, one pharmacy in               
Kermit, West Virginia, a remote town of about 400 people which sits on the state border                
with Kentucky, dispensed about 9,000,000 doses of hydrocodone during the study           
period.   84
 
A CDC Map of County-Level Prescriptions Per 100 Persons in 2013  85
 
Of course, it is quite improbable that all of these opioids are being consumed by the                
population of Kermit, and it is likely that they are being used in Kentucky, surrounding               
counties, and elsewhere. The models used in this study do not even account for              
prescribing patterns, much less the illicit redistribution of opioids and other drugs.  
 
Now that the CDC has made prescribing data available, responsible researchers           
addressing the questions at the core of this project should consider using it. Notably, a               
84 Chris McGreal, “Why were millions of opioid pills sent to a West Virginia town of 3,000?” ​The 
Guardian ​ (October 2019). 
85 CDC. ​U.S. County Prescribing Rates ​, (2013). 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxcounty2013.html 
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quick visual examination of the opioid prescribing patterns of the CDC’s county-level,            
population adjusted, rate map shows obvious similarities to the maps produced in my             
analysis (see page 24) which shows mortality from prescription drug overdose. 
 
Prescription drug-related mortality and harm data for large metropolitan areas, where           
medical facilities, industry-physician relationships, and documented health visits are         
concentrated might prove to be of greater use than the most populous county-level data              
used here. City identifiers exist within the Open Payments data in its original form as               
released by CMS, thus, aggregating financial data across cities is a relatively simple             
procedure. Additionally, theory in the urban studies paradigm, which has long addressed            
drug use and abuse, might be well-suited to address the consequences of            
direct-to-physician marketing on public health. 
 
Given the variation in toxicity of opioids, a measure of the opioid equivalence             
—typically given in equivalent units of morphine— might be used in future studies.             
Methodologically, marketing expenditures on more potent opioids could be weighted to           
reflect their potential for abuse and mortality. More specifically, this would mean            
identifying opioids according to measures of both their toxicity and marketing. 
 
The statistical modeling procedures used in this study do not employ estimated error             
margins provided by the various agencies who collect and structure the data. In future              
research, researchers might include error margins for explanatory and control variables           
in the analysis by performing an error weighted regression. This could be accomplished             
by performing an ordinary least squares fit and comparing it to a weighted least squares               
(WLS) fit, the latter of which would utilize the margin of error estimates. WLS              
regression has the advantage of being able to include these error margins. 
 
Additional injury-related and health outcomes data could be employed. Outcome          
variables like hospitalization or Narcan use should be more sensitive indicators of the             
public health effects of over-prescribing and direct-to-physician marketing. Also, now          
that data over a longer period of time is available, as well as data concerning prescribing                
patterns, these data could be used to make a more complete and longitudinal model.              
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Additionally, longitudinal studies can account for the continued effects of          
direct-to-physician marketing over time, examining the compounding or weakening         
influence of payments over a number of years. 
 
Obviously, understandings of opioid mortality cannot always be constructed on the           
basis of coefficients, p-values, regressions, and positivism. Social scientists concerned          
with direct-to-physician opioid marketing and mortality might consider alternative         
methodological approaches like ethnographic study, interviewing, legal-archival work,        
and discourse analysis. During the course of this project I benefited from informal             
discussions, or rather, interviews with a handful of researchers and doctors who have             
experiential knowledge about these practices, and without this “data” the study could            
not have been completed. 
 
Finally, this study was guided by a positivist, technocratic, “data-driven” approach. In            
other words, the study was driven by a hegemonic epistemological paradigm and its             
assumptions about the proper application of data. There are always normative and            
political assumptions embedded in even the most “data-oriented” and supposedly          
neutral approaches. Unsurprisingly then, the conclusions of the study have implications           
for public policy, but do not contribute to pressing theoretical debates in sociology. For              
example, the study could have taken direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing as a           
unique faucet of biopolitical governmentality under late capitalism which facilitates the           
dispossession of indigenous lands in a settler colony, but instead the study uncritically             
embraces a vague humanitarian ethic which regards mortality as an indicator for social             
well-being. 
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Appendix I 
Category Underlying Cause Contributing Cause (Multiple Cause) 
Illicit drug 
poisoning 
X40 X41 X42 X43 X44 X60 
X61 X62 X63 X64 X85 Y10 
Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 
T40.1 T40.5 T40.7 T40.8 T40.9 T43.6 
Pharmaceutical 
poisoning 
X40 X41 X42 X43 X44 X60 
X61 X62 X63 X64 X85 Y10 
Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 
T36 T37 T38 T39 T40.2 T40.3 T40.4 T41 
T42 T43.0 T43.1 T43.2. T43.3 T43.4 
T43.5 T43.8 T43.9 T44 T45 T46 T47 T48 
T49 T50.0 T50.1 T50.2 T50.3 T50.4 
T50.5 T50.6 T50.7 T50.8 
Prescription 
opioid poisoning 
X40 X41 X42 X43 X44 X60 
X61 X62 X63 X64 X85 Y10 
Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 
T40.2 T40.3 T40.4 
Other 
pharmaceutical 
poisoning 
X40 X41 X42 X43 X44 X60 
X61 X62 X63 X64 X85 Y10 
Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 
T36 T37 T38 T39 T41 T42 T43.0 T43.1 
T43.2. T43.3 T43.4 T43.5 T43.8 T43.9 
T44 T45 T46 T47 T48 T49 T50.0 T50.1 
T50.2 T50.3 T50.4 T50.5 T50.6 T50.7 
T50.8 
Illicit opioid 
poisoning (opium 
and heroin) 
X40 X41 X42 X43 X44 X60 
X61 X62 X63 X64 X85 Y10 
Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 
T40.0 T40.1 
All opioid 
poisoning (illicit 
and prescription) 
X40 X41 X42 X43 X44 X60 
X61 X62 X63 X64 X85 Y10 
Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 
T40.0 T40.1 T40.2 T40.3 T40.4 
See Appendix II for Coding Detail. The state-level data in the current study includes              
deaths coded as T50.9. 
 
 
Appendix II: Mortality Schedule ( ​MortalityA​) Coding and CDC Classification Detail 
Underlying Causes: 
X40 (Accidental poisoning by and exposure to nonopioid analgesics, antipyretics and           
antirheumatics) 
X41 (Accidental poisoning by and exposure to antiepileptic, sedative-hypnotic,         
antiparkinsonism and psychotropic drugs, not elsewhere classified) 
X42 (Accidental poisoning by and exposure to narcotics and psychodysleptics          
[hallucinogens], not elsewhere classified) 
X43 (Accidental poisoning by and exposure to other drugs acting on the autonomic             
nervous system) 
X44 (Accidental poisoning by and exposure to other and unspecified drugs,           
medicaments and biological substances) 
X60 (Intentional self-poisoning by and exposure to nonopioid analgesics, antipyretics          
and antirheumatics) 
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X61 (Intentional self-poisoning by and exposure to antiepileptic, sedative-hypnotic,         
antiparkinsonism and psychotropic drugs, not elsewhere classified) 
X62 (Intentional self-poisoning by and exposure to narcotics and psychodysleptics          
[hallucinogens], not elsewhere classified) 
X63 (Intentional self-poisoning by and exposure to other drugs acting on the            
autonomic nervous system) 
X64 (Intentional self-poisoning by and exposure to other and unspecified drugs,           
medicaments and biological substances) 
X85 (Assault by drugs, medicaments and biological substances) 
Y10 (Poisoning by and exposure to nonopioid analgesics, antipyretics and          
antirheumatics, undetermined intent) 
Y11 (Poisoning by and exposure to antiepileptic, sedative-hypnotic, antiparkinsonism         
and psychotropic drugs, not elsewhere classified, undetermined intent) 
Y12 (Poisoning by and exposure to narcotics and psychodysleptics [hallucinogens],          
not elsewhere classified, undetermined intent) 
Y13 (Poisoning by and exposure to other drugs acting on the autonomic nervous             
system, undetermined intent) 
Y14 (Poisoning by and exposure to other and unspecified drugs, medicaments and            
biological substances, undetermined intent) 
Contributing Causes: 
T36 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of systemic antibiotics 
T37 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of other systemic anti- infectives             
and antiparasitics 
T38 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of hormones and their synthetic             
substitutes and antagonists, not elsewhere classified 
T39 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of nonopioid analgesics,           
antipyretics and antirheumatics 
T40 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of narcotics and           
psychodysleptics [hallucinogens] 
T41 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of anesthetics and therapeutic            
gases 
T42 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of antiepileptic, sedative-           
hypnotic and antiparkinsonism drugs 
T43 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of psychotropic drugs, not            
elsewhere classified 
T44 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of drugs primarily affecting the             
autonomic nervous system 
T45 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of primarily systemic and            
hematological agents, not elsewhere classified 
T46 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of agents primarily affecting the             
cardiovascular system 
T47 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of agents primarily affecting the             
gastrointestinal system 
T48 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of agents primarily acting on             
smooth and skeletal muscles and the respiratory system 
T49 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of topical agents primarily            
affecting skin and mucous membrane and by ophthalmological,        
otorhinolaryngological and dental drugs 
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T50 Poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of diuretics and other and             
unspecified drugs, medicaments and biological substances 
 
Documentation of the drug schedules/classifications used in this study are available to 
researchers on request ( ​leamy@newschool.edu ​) 
 
Appendix III: Variable and Source Table 
Variable Source Source Location 
ID Assignment  
County United States Census Bureau 
http://www2.census.gov/geo/docs/referenc
e/codes/files/national_county.txt 
County_FIPS United States Census Bureau 
http://www2.census.gov/geo/docs/referenc
e/codes/files/national_county.txt 
CountyPopulation2013 United States Census Bureau 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableserv
ices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkm
k 
CountyPopulation2014 United States Census Bureau 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableserv
ices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkm
k 
All_Cause_ Mortality_Count 
CDC Wonder Multiple Cause 
2014 http://wonder.cdc.gov/ 
All_Cause_ Mortality_Rate CDC Wonder / Calculated http://wonder.cdc.gov/ 
Age_Adjusted_Mortality CDC Wonder http://wonder.cdc.gov/ 
All_Drug_Mortality_Count 
CDC Wonder ( X40-X44, 
X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14) 
AllCauseMortality 2014 http://wonder.cdc.gov/ 
All_Drug_Mortality_Rate 
( X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, 
Y10-Y14)/CountyPopulation 
AllCauseMortality 2014 http://wonder.cdc.gov/ 
Prescription_Drug_Mortality_
Count 
CDC WONDER (T36-T39, 
T40.2-T40.4, T41-T43.5, 
T43.7 -T50.8) http://wonder.cdc.gov/ 
Prescription_Drug_Mortality_
Rate 
(T36-T39, T40.2-T40.4, 
T41-T43.5, and T43.7 
-T50.8)/CountyPopulation http://wonder.cdc.gov/ 
Opioid_Analgesic_Mortality_
Count 
CDC WONDER 
(T40.2-T40.4) http://wonder.cdc.gov/ 
Opioid_Analgesic_Mortality_
Rate 
(T40.2-T40.4)/CountyPopulat
ion http://wonder.cdc.gov/ 
Uninsured_Count 
Small Area Health Insurance 
Estimates (SAHIE) https://www.census.gov/did/www/sahie/ 
Uninsured_MOE_Count 
Small Area Health Insurance 
Estimates (SAHIE) https://www.census.gov/did/www/sahie/ 
Uninsured_Rate 
Small Area Health Insurance 
Estimates (SAHIE) https://www.census.gov/did/www/sahie/ 
Uninsured_MOE_Rate 
Small Area Health Insurance 
Estimates (SAHIE) https://www.census.gov/did/www/sahie/ 
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Insured_Count 
Small Area Health Insurance 
Estimates (SAHIE) https://www.census.gov/did/www/sahie/ 
Insured_MOE_Count 
Small Area Health Insurance 
Estimates (SAHIE) https://www.census.gov/did/www/sahie/ 
Insured_Rate 
Small Area Health Insurance 
Estimates (SAHIE) https://www.census.gov/did/www/sahie/ 
Insured_MOE_Rate 
Small Area Health Insurance 
Estimates (SAHIE) https://www.census.gov/did/www/sahie/ 
Drug Poisoning Mortality 
American Medical 
Association Master File 2012 
http://www.healthindicators.gov/Indicators
/Primary-care-providers-per-100000_25/Pr
ofile/Data 
Estimate_Gini_Index 
American Community Survey 
2013 - 5 Year Estimates 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Cens
us/library/publications/2014/acs/acsbr13-0
2.pdf 
Margin_of_Error_Gini_Index 
American Community Survey 
2013 - 5 Year Estimates 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Cens
us/library/publications/2014/acs/acsbr13-0
2.pdf 
Household_Income 
American Community Survey 
2013 - 5 Year Estimates 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Cens
us/library/publications/2014/acs/acsbr13-0
2.pdf 
Demographics 
United States Census Bureau 
2014 Estimates 
https://www.census.gov/popest/data/counti
es/asrh/2014/files/CC-EST2014-ALLDAT
A.csv 
Unemployment 
United States Department of 
Agriculture - Economic 
Research Service (ACS) 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/cou
nty-level-data-sets/download-data.aspx 
Education 
United States Department of 
Agriculture - Economic 
Research Service (ACS) 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/cou
nty-level-data-sets/download-data.aspx 
CDC Interval Prescription 
Drug Mortality 
NYT and Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention  
Drug Poisoning Mortality CDC / NCHS 
http://blogs.cdc.gov/nchs-data-visualizatio
n/drug-poisoning-mortality/ 
Race 
American Community Survey 
2014  - 5 Year Estimates 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Cens
us/library/publications/2014/acs/acsbr13-0
2.pdf 
 
 
 
 
